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Hedy Lamarr was once known as "the most beautiful woman in the
world." The legendary actress graced more
than 30 films, starring alongside such renowned performers as
Spencer Tracy, Judy Garland, Lana Turner, and dozens of other
celebrated figures from the glory days of Hollywood. At the time of
her death, on Jan. 19, 2000, most remembered her this way--as the
classic cinema siren.
But all too few realized that Lamarr was also a brilliant
inventor whose technological legacy would continue to have an impact
nearly six decades later. In 1942 Lamarr and avant-garde music
composer George Antheil were awarded the patent for a device known
as the "secret communication system," which they donated to the
Allied war
effort. At the time no one could foresee that this invention
would become so important that its effects would shape the world's
technological landscape well into the 21st century or that the ideas
which evolved from the original concepts would spawn a
billion-dollar industry.
"The Most Beautiful Woman in the World"
Hedy Lamarr was born Hedwig Eva Maria Kiesler on Nov. 9, 1914, in
Vienna, Austria, the daughter of Emil and Gertrud Kiesler. She
received a private education and learned Hungarian, Italian,
English, and other languages. Her budding film career took a turn in
1932 when she starred in Ecstasy, a
Czechoslovakian film directed by Gustav Machaty. Although several
critics acknowledged the film's artistic intent, it was racy enough
to be condemned by Pope Pius XI and caused international
controversy.
Her newfound fame attracted the attention of Friedrich Mandl, a
wealthy Austrian munitions dealer who introduced her to a life of
wealth and luxury, and the couple married on Aug. 10, 1933. Mandl
traveled in some of the most powerful circles in Europe. He was a
notoriously unscrupulous businessman who was known for selling arms
to a wide range of clients, often in violation of the Treaty
of Versailles. Despite his reputation, Mandl was a prominent
member of Viennese society, and Lamarr and her husband entertained
guests who included aristocrats, industrialists, artists, and key
political and military figures such as Benito
Mussolini. While entertaining these guests, Lamarr heard many
conversations concerning state-of-the-art weapons technology.
Early in her marriage, Lamarr would learn that Mandl was a
jealous and possessive husband as well. When he traveled on
business, he would keep her under what amounted to house arrest.
Lamarr became a prisoner in her husband's vast estate; if she left
the house, Mandl's spies would report her every movement. After four
years of imprisonment, she grew weary of her husband's control, and
was troubled by the darkening mood of Austria during Hitler's rise
to power. While her husband was away, Lamarr disguised herself as a
servant and escaped to Paris, then continued on to London. There she
met Louis
B. Mayer of MGM, who eventually signed her to a seven-year
contract. Lamarr had escaped to the waiting arms of Hollywood and
stardom.
She would go on to appear in such films as Algiers (1938),
Ziegfeld Girl (1941), Tortilla Flat (1942), and
Samson and Delilah (1949). Although her roles and movies were
somewhat memorable, it appears that Lamarr grew more famous than the
films in which she starred. Hollywood's memory of her iconic, sultry
image and her fabled beauty have far outlasted the popularity of her
cinematic contributions.
Despite her Hollywood success, she was once quoted as saying,
"Any girl can be glamorous. All you have to do is stand still and
look stupid." She would consider her beauty to be a burden, the
source of all her problems. Lamarr volunteered to work with the U.S.
government in the war effort, by developing technologies and
offering intelligence based on the extensive experience gained
during her marriage to Mandl, but was instead encouraged to sell war
bonds to raise money. She agreed to do so and helped sell more than
$7 million in bonds, but she was always seeking an opportunity to
assist the government by using her too frequently overlooked
brainpower. When she met composer George Antheil in the summer of
1940, she realized that she might have found her
chance.
"The Bad Boy of Music"
Although he was a classically trained composer, George
Antheil was dubbed the "bad boy of music" for his "ultramodern,"
avant-garde style. He lived in Paris in the 1920s, and his
contemporaries included the likes of Ernest Hemingway, James Joyce,
and T.S. Eliot.
His work, which Antheil himself described as "coldly
mechanistic," was viewed by some as an attempt to interpret the
modern, industrial age. Indeed, his compositions would reveal a
technological bent. His most famous composition, Le Ballet Mécanique, was
first presented in 1926 and incorporated electric bells, airplane
propellers, automobile horns, and as many as 16 synchronized player
pianos.
As a composer, Antheil was ahead of his time by several decades;
the advent of computers and later forms of electronic music would
inspire further explorations on these themes. Nonetheless, if
Antheil's Ballet Mécanique was a work of art as seen from the
perspective of technology, after meeting with Lamarr he would
introduce an artist's interpretation of technology.
The Meeting of the Minds
Years after his time in Paris, Antheil found himself in
Hollywood, composing scores for films. He was a columnist for
Esquire and considered himself an amateur expert in the
dubious science of "endocrine criminology"--he even wrote a book on
the subject. After meeting Antheil, Lamarr believed she had found
the perfect person to help her realize her ideas, and the admiration
was mutual. In his autobiography, Bad Boy of Music, Antheil
attributes the fundamental concept of the invention to Lamarr:
"Compared to most Hollywood actresses we know, Hedy is an
intellectual giant." Nevertheless, Antheil's ability to use
technology in novel ways proved to be just as vital to their
collaboration as Lamarr's knowledge of military armaments.
During her first marriage Lamarr learned that the Germans
considered the inaccuracy of torpedoes
to be one of the most pressing problems in naval
warfare. Strong ocean currents made the trajectory of the
torpedo hard to predict, and various solutions were considered. A
wire could communicate corrections to the torpedo from a ship, but
in some cases the wire would need to be more than a mile long. A radio
communication between the ship and the torpedo might be
established, but the signal could be subject to interference from
other transmissions, or worse yet, the signal could be easily picked
up and jammed.
If Germany and Italy coveted this undiscovered technology, Lamarr
felt that for the Allies it was all the more vital. In a 1945
article in The Stars and Stripes, she stated, "British fliers
were over hostile territory as soon as they crossed the channel, but
German aviators were over friendly territory most of the way to
England.... I got the idea for my invention when I tried to think of
some way to even the balance for the British. A radio controlled
torpedo I thought would do it."
Lamarr theorized that if a radio signal could be made to jump
from frequency to frequency, the signal as a whole would be
undetectable and thus impossible to jam; if an enemy tried to pick
up the signal, only small bits could be detected out of the entire
sequence. The signal would also be able to withstand random noise or
interference. She had the answer, but with one problem: How to
enable the receiver (the torpedo) to use the same pattern of
"frequency hopping" as the sender?
Fortunately, Antheil was the perfect choice for collaboration.
Decades before electronic circuitry would allow machines to
"remember" specific instructions, Antheil had already conceived of a
technique that would allow the synchronization of two separate
machines for his eccentric symphony, Le Ballet Mécanique, in
which he synchronized 16 player pianos. In the symphony the player
pianos could be made to play a particular sequence by reading
identical patterns of punched holes on a paper roll.
Applying these concepts directly to Lamarr's idea, a
radio-controlled torpedo would use a similar system to synchronize a
sequence of frequency jumps with an air-based control station aboard
an airplane
flying overhead. The control station would transmit instructions to
the torpedo, but rather than send the signal over a single
frequency, it would send the signal over a seemingly random sequence
of changing frequencies. To an outside observer monitoring a single
frequency, these communications would appear as noise, but the
torpedo would be equipped to receive the signal on the same complex
pattern of frequency switches. Although the patent specifies that as
few as 8 different frequencies would be sufficient, Antheil's roll
would accommodate 88 different carrier frequencies--precisely
matching the number of keys on a piano keyboard.
After many hours of refinement and consultation with an
electrical engineer, Lamarr and Antheil were ready to apply for a
patent. In 1942 the U.S. Patent Office granted them Patent No.
2,292,387: Secret Communication System.
The Patent
The patent itself
was much more than a treatment of the key concepts; it was
surprisingly detailed and thorough. Nevertheless, when Lamarr and
Antheil passed the patent on to the government, it would not be
used, at least not during the war. There has been much speculation
as to why the invention was not recognized. Obviously, many would be
quick to conclude that a stubborn military was reluctant to adopt a
technology that had been developed by a pair of Hollywood
celebrities, particularly a movie sex symbol. Some Naval officials
would explain that the invention was too cumbersome for a torpedo,
despite Antheil's insistence that the device could be made as small
as a wristwatch. Indeed, Lamarr and Antheil had both speculated that
the mention of player-piano style rolls in the patent may have hurt
its chances of being brought into production. Were this the case, it
would have been a tragically biased oversight--paper punched
cards had operated machinery, in the same manner as the
player-piano roll, since the 19th century.
The schematics, as drawn up by Antheil, detailed specific
components and structures, and a working prototype could conceivably
have been built from, or at least based on, the diagrams. However,
the system, as it was conceived at the time, would have been far too
impractical to try to deploy in the field on a wide basis and wasn't
seen as a technology that the military should focus its efforts on
developing during wartime. Putting the actual concept into general
use would not be possible until the advent of transistorized
electronics. In 1962 a communications system using an electronic
variation on this design was developed by Sylvania and employed by
the naval ships that formed the blockade during the Cuban
missile crisis.
Unfortunately for Lamarr and Antheil, their patent expired in
1959; its 17-year period had elapsed just months after Antheil's
death. Because the pair, in good faith, had donated their design to
the government and sought no financial compensation, they never
pursued further involvement in the patent. If they had tried to
patent additional modifications to the invention, they could have
extended the length of time during which they had the rights to the
technology.
Perhaps their act of good will was naive; pursuing commercial
production might have increased the chances that their design would
have been developed. But more than anything else, Lamarr and Antheil
had run headlong into a growing trend in technological development.
Invention no longer occurred in the workshops of single,
larger-than-life individuals--the days of Thomas Edison, Alexander
Graham Bell, and the Wright Brothers were long past. In fact, Edison's
success is often attributed to his shrewd business savvy and his
ability to operate in the commercial world as well as to his genius.
Invention had become the domain of large commercial or
institutional hierarchies, as evidenced by the development of atomic
energy, aviation, the automotive industry, and many other fields.
Technological development within the military itself had long since
evolved into a vast bureaucratic structure in which the individual
voices of Lamarr and Antheil would have been easily lost. Their
philosophy had been one of patriotism and philanthropy--ironically,
had their motivation been entrepreneurial, their invention might
have seen the light of day, perhaps in time to aid the war effort to
which they had earnestly sought to contribute.
Nevertheless, the design is recognized as the "generic patent,"
and from this first development many other technologies emerged.
Lamarr and Antheil's design would later be seen as the first
instance of spread spectrum
communications: the "spread" of a radio signal over a large
bandwidth in order to prevent detection and jamming. As a result,
Lamarr and Antheil's original notions have become so important that
even today the staggering effects of this technology have not yet
been fully realized.
The Legacy of Spread Spectrum
The "Secret Communication System" was decades ahead of its time.
The electronics technology that could put Lamarr and Antheil's
"frequency hopping" technique to full use would not be seen for many
years, and over time frequency hopping would evolve into spread
spectrum technology. The U.S. government used spread spectrum at the
heart of its $25-billion Milstar
defense satellite network. In 1981 the military released part of
their version of this technology to the FCC to be reviewed for
commercial use, and in 1985 the public began to use spread spectrum
technology.
Since that time, complemented by the developments in
semiconductor technology, spread spectrum has made possible the
rapid growth of wireless technology. Spread spectrum allows not only
secure communications but can also accommodate many users over a
limited range of frequencies. In essence, all users transmit and
receive on their own discreet pattern, synchronized with their
parent systems. As a result, this sharing of frequency can take
place with little overlap or loss of signal.
In 1999 more than 150 million people were using wireless phones.
Motorola, one of the leading producers of wireless communications,
predicts that by 2003 there will be as many as a billion users. In
some countries ground-based phone service is often cost-prohibitive
and sometimes irrelevant. For younger generations wireless
communications is becoming a way of life in which the personal phone
replaces the home phone. This trend will surely grow as equipment
and service become cheaper and better. In developing nations the
proliferation of wireless communications may serve as a solution to
the logistical problems of establishing a conventional
telecommunications infrastructure.
The Qualcomm corporation owns the commercial rights to a form of
spread spectrum called CDMA
(code-division multiple access); a large part of the company's
almost unparalleled success comes from royalty fees based on the
licensing of this technology.
Other companies, such as Nokia and Ericsson, have also flourished
from the growth of wireless telecommunications. Beyond phones, many
new applications have continued to emerge: wireless networking,
mobile Internet access, interactive television, and countless other
possibilities. In each of these applications users can be assured a
high level of privacy due to the fundamental security afforded by
spread spectrum.
Many patents have acknowledged Lamarr and Antheil's patent as
"the generic patent." Although the patent was highly specific in its
application, its functionality included a new, highly disruptive
technology--what contemporary entrepreneurs might refer to as a
"killer app." Unfortunately, this technology would lie dormant for
decades. During their lifetimes Lamarr and Antheil never saw any
payment for their work, despite the fact that they laid the
groundwork for a billion-dollar industry.
In 1997, more than half a century after the original patent, the
technological community would finally catch up with Lamarr and
Antheil. The Electronic Frontier
Foundation, an online privacy and rights organization, honored
the pair with its Pioneer
Award, an accolade recognizing individuals for their work in
"expanding knowledge, freedom, efficiency, and utility." Even in
1997 the technology was only beginning to gain momentum. A fellow
honoree, David Hughes, recommended Lamarr and Antheil for the award.
In his nomination letter he expressed his amazement that a woman of
Lamarr's day, "not operating out of a research or university center,
grasped and articulated the novel technical ideas underlying spread
spectrum" and remarked that in 1997 very few people even understood
spread spectrum or its staggering implications on privacy.
When Lamarr died of natural causes in her home in Orlando,
Florida, many reflected upon her disarming beauty, her charm and
personality, and her seductive onscreen presence. Few made more than
a passing mention of her contribution to the world of technology,
and some overlooked it altogether. Though she was idolized as "the
most beautiful woman in the world," she would have eagerly traded
the trappings of a Hollywood star for the real-life role of a
brilliant inventor. As Lamarr's films pass from a culture's memory
and an era of Hollywood fades into history, it seems appropriate
that the work of her visionary, innovative mind should be her most
enduring legacy.